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1.  Introduction 
Japan’s current banking problems, which are thought to be closely related to the 
economic downturn in Japan, began in the early 1990s and have festered and worsened 
throughout the 1990s (see for example Hoshi and Kashyap 1999; Kashyap 2002). This long 
duration and serious negative impact to the economy make it unique to Japan. Using a 
similar definition to that of the U.S., the NPLs for all banks were about ¥30 trillion in 
1998-2000, which accounts about 5-6 percent of GDP (Table 1)
1. The NPLs increased to 
about ¥32.52 trillion (around 6.5 percent of GDP) in March 2001, and jumped to about 
¥42.03 trillion (around 8.88 percent of GDP) in 2002. 
The bad loans problems have bankrupted 176 depository institutions during 
1991-2001 of which 20 were banks. The peak of the bankruptcies was around late 1997 
when five banks failed. Among them was a nationwide city bank, the Hokkaido Takushoku 
Bank, which was the first major bank to shut its doors since the end of the World War II. By 
this time, the problem in the financial sector became so acute that it endangered the viability 
of the entire financial system. A huge amount of funds including public funds has been used 
to cope with the banking problems. Since March 1998, the government has spent about ¥10 
trillion. Another ¥20 trillion was also used by the Deposit Insurance Corporation (DIC) at the 
end of March 2001. 
An abundant literature explores the causes of the banking crisis. There are at least 
four competing views. First, the accumulation of bad loans was due to the collapse of the 
asset price bubble due to macroeconomic policy mistakes (Takeda and Turner 1992; Hamada 
1995). Second, the crisis was due to failure to create an effective system of banking 
regulation and supervision and safety net framework before adopting financial deregulation 
                                                  
1  The information on NPLs is not available before 1998. Japanese financial institutions began to disclose 
comprehensively defined NPLs for the first time in March 1998. 
 2(Ito 1999; Patrick 1999; Milhaupt; 1999; Nakaso 2001; Hoshi 2002). Third, financial 
deregulation made good client firms shy away. Banks, therefore, turned to riskier industries 
in particular the real estate industry, and hence ended up with a huge amount of bad loans 
(Hoshi and Kashyap 1999). Fourth, a weak corporate governance mechanism is responsible 
for excessive risk taking by bank management (Horiuchi and Hanazaki (2001, 2003b, and 
2003b)). 
This paper investigates the argument of Horiuchi and Hanazaki. Specifically, we 
argue that the competitive-restricting regulation regime implemented since the WWII 
through 1990s had created moral hazard problems in the banking sector. As banks were 
ensured that they faced little competition and would not let fail, their management had 
incentives to engage in excessive risk-taking activities. The moral hazard problems could 
have been controlled by either financial regulators or depositors. Unfortunately, financial 
regulators are not reliable monitors due to the principle-agency problem (Kane 1995). 
Besides, they were incompetent because they could not obtain the necessary information to 
verify banks’ loan portfolios. This is due to the common practice in Japan in which the main 
banks bail out their client firms. The loan portfolios could be perfectly substantiated, if the 
information on whether or not the financially distressed firms to be bailed out could recover 
was known ex ante. Likewise, depositors are less likely to be tough monitors because they 
have been provided a blanket guarantee.   
Perhaps, the only potential monitors in the Japanese banking system are large 
shareholders (see also Dinc 2003). In this paper, we investigate whether large shareholders 
are active or passive monitors. To identify the identity of large shareholders, we construct a 
unique dataset of bank ownership. Our focus is in particular the top three whom we believe 
own enough shares to have sufficient incentives to exert control. Our sample covers all 
banks for the period of 1980-2000. We find that insurers predominate as the top three 
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shareholders are dominated by insurers and national wide banks. Amazingly, the ownership 
structure has been stable over a long period of time. The ranking of the largest shareholders 
as well as the percentage of shareholdings have been stable for the 20 years of our sample 
period. To our knowledge, we are the first who investigate this issue empirically.   
We argue that the largest shareholders (insurers and banks) are passive in 
disciplining bank management for the following reasons. First, both insurers and banks 
themselves appear to have weak corporate governance. As for insurers, there exists no 
control by shareholders as most of them are mutual companies owned by dispersed 
policyholders. There also exists no substitute mechanism e.g., the market competition, in 
both banking and insurance industries to force the management to be efficient (Hanazaki and 
Horiuchi 2001). Second, the monitoring incentives are worsen by the fact that insurers 
appear to receive some financial benefits from being non hostile to banks. These benefits are 
the opportunities to walk in to bank offices to sell insurance policies to the bank employees, 
which seem to be huge transactions. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that the management of banks with insurers and banks 
among the top three shareholders is likely to be entrenched, and hence perform poorer than 
other banks. Our results show that during the 1980s when the economy was booming the 
entrenched banks tend to overlend. The incentives to extend lending are probably 
attributable to the promotion system that was closely tied to the amount of loans officers 
were able to lend. During the economic downturn in the 1990s, however, entrenched 
managers did not terminate lending and did not dramatically undertake restructurings. These 
results support our argument that large shareholders were passive in governance of banks in 
Japan.  
 4Along with other ongoing literature, our results highlight one important issue in 
corporate governance that the identity of large shareholders does matter. More precisely, 
when the largest shareholders are in the financial sector, in particular insurance and banking, 
they appear to be not tough. Our findings are in line with Morck et al. (2000) who 
investigate the role of large shareholder activism in Japanese firms. They document that 
bank ownership is negatively related to firm value. In contrast, corporate shareholders appear 
to be tougher as monitors and are beneficial to the firms (Morck et al. 2000; Yafeh and Yosha 
2003). 
  The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the 
institutional backgrounds. In Section 3 we present the unique ownership structure of banks 
and develop testable hypotheses. Section 4 reports the main results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  The Institutional Background: A Review of Governance Structure of Banks in 
Japan 
In this section, we discuss the regulatory environment that creates incentives for 
bank managers to engage in high risk lending practices. In addition, we show that the 
corporate governance structure of banks is weak. None of the mechanisms that are supposed 
to curtail the moral hazard problems appear to be effective. We argue that these institutional 
frameworks provide autonomy to bank management. 
 
2.1 The Comprehensive Safety Net System   
The banking system during the post-war period and until the mid of the 1990s was 
operated under the competition-restricting  regulation environment and the status quo was 
protected under the so-called “convoy system” (Patrick 1999; Spiegel 1999; Hoshi 2002; 
Hanazaki and Horiuchi 2003a among others). Under this system, banks were ensured that de 
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was achieved via regulatory measures such as controlling interest rates, fees and financial 
products, dividing business lines and branch restrictions, and restriction on new entry to the 
banking and financial business (Hamada and Horiuchi 1986; Hoshi 2002; Van Rixtel 2002).   
In addition, an extensive safety net was established to prevent bank failures. Under 
this approach, the Ministry of Finance (MOF) arranged for stronger banks to absorb 
insolvent banks by assuming the liabilities and assets of the insolvent banks (Hoshi 2002). In 
some cases, the MOF placed its officials on the board of the failing bank to signal its 
commitment of not allowing the bank to fail. At other times, the Bank of Japan injected 
special loans to trouble banks to prevent systematic bank failures (Hanazaki and Horiuchi 
2002). 
In effect, the comprehensive safety net that ensures no failure had created acute 
moral hazard problems (Kane 1993; Patrick 1999; Hanazaki and Horiuchi 2003a). In 
addition, the absence of competition implies that there exists no force to discourage bank 
management from fraudulent activities (see Allen and Gale 2000). The “no failure policy,” 
however, was de facto terminated around the first half of the 1990s (Nakaso 2001; Hoshi 
2002; Hanazaki and Horiuchi 2003). Some troubled banks ended up being allowed to fail. 
The conventional safety net was replaced by a deposit insurance system that was developed 
to be more comprehensive (Milhaupt 1999; Nakaso 2001). Even though one city bank, the 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank was allowed to fail in 1997, it still appears that the current policy 
follows the too-big-to-fail policy (Van Rixtel et al. 2003). In principle, the too-big-to-fail 
policy creates the moral hazard problems in a similar manner to the no failure policy. 
 
2.2 Depositors as (Passive) Monitors 
  Depositors’ position has been secured via the deposit insurance system that was 
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insured deposits up to a prescribed limit for each depositor of a failed bank. However, de 
facto the MOF had provided a blanket guarantee, which was formally made official in 1996 
((Hanazaki and Horiuchi 2001; 2003a). As widely recognized, the presence of a blanket 
guarantee removes any incentive that insured depositors and creditors have to control bank 
management (Merton 1977; Keeley 1990). Their funds are fully protected regardless of the 
outcomes of the investment strategies that the management chooses.   
    
2.3 The Financial Regulators: Monitor or Collude with the Management? 
Ideally, under a regulated financial system, the financial authority could act as 
monitors who conduct the monitoring necessary to prevent the management from fraud and 
self-dealing (see Black et al. 1978; Dewatripont and Tirole 1994). However, as contended by 
Kane (1995), regulators may not be credible monitors because of the principal-agent 
problem between regulators, banks, and taxpayers.   
In the Japanese context, Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2003a and 2003b) argue that 
regulatory monitoring in Japan had never been effective for the following two reasons. First, 
the financial authority faced little pressure from taxpayers because not only they are not well 
informed, but also have less incentive to monitor. Not until March 1998 when public funds 
of almost ¥2 trillion were used for the first time to rescue financially distressed financial 
institutions did taxpayers seem to fully realize that they had been bearing the costs of all the 
bail-outs.  
Second, the regulators were not competent because they did not have inspection 
expertise. This seems to be one of the reasons why the MOF, who had been responsible for 
overseeing bank management for decades, was replaced by a new regulatory agency, the 
Financial Supervisory Agency, in June 1998. In addition, the financial regulators do not have 
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assessment of the soundness of a bank’s management. The opacity of the loan portfolios is 
mainly due to the common practice of bailing out financially distressed client firms by the 
main banks. If the emerging rate of the bailed out firms from a financial distress were known 
ex ante, one could perfectly obtain the precise figures of NPLs and hence could verify the 
information on Japanese bank loan portfolios. 
We are also skeptical about the argument that banks were disciplined via the 
amakudari system. (Aoki et al. 1994) This system is a practice of having high ranked retired 
officers of the Bank of Japan and MOF on the bank management team. In fact, Horiuchi and 
Shimizu (2001) and Van Rixtel (2002) find that banks with amakudari have lower capital 
adequacy ratio and higher NPLs. They conclude that it is a sort of collusion between banks 
and officials. By adopting a policy of forbearance towards them, the regulators receive job 
opportunities for retired officials in return. 
 
2.4 Large Shareholders 
  Perhaps the only potential monitors who have the incentive to discipline bank 
management are large shareholders as they own sizable shares, and hence would bear the 
bankruptcy risk (Demsetz 1983, 1986; Shleifer and Vishny 1997). To investigate whether 
large shareholders are indeed potential effective monitors, one needs to understand the 
structure of ownership and control of banks. Unlike non-financial corporations on which 
extensive research exists, we know very little about ownership and control of banks in Japan. 
 
3. Ownership and Control of Japanese Banks       
In this section, we identify the largest shareholders and the degree of ownership 
concentration. This information is crucial in determining the degree of large shareholder 
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Barclay and Holderness 1989; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Demsetz and Villalonga 2001). 
 
3.1 Sample and Data Sources 
Our sample consists of all listed banks in Japan which are classified in the following 
categories: nationwide “city” banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks, regional banks and 
second tier regional banks. The period of study is 1980-2000 which represent both pre and 
post bubble periods. As there were mergers and bank failures during this period, this panel 
data is unbalanced over the years. The sample includes 93-118 banks. 
We manually collected the ownership data from a rich data source, the yukashoken 
hokokusho (company annual report), which is published in Japanese annually by the 
Ministry of Finance. The ownership data includes the information on the top ten 
shareholders as of the end of a fiscal year which is March. We also collect the financial data 
from the same data source. 
 
3.2 Ownership Structure: Who Owns Banks in Japan? 
  The aggregate shareholdings of banks for the period of 1980-2000 are shown in 
Figure 1.1. Financial institutions including banks, security firms, life and non-life insurers 
hold the largest fraction of banks’ shares. Their shareholdings have been increasing over time. 
Specifically, financial institutions held about 37 percent of banks’ shares in 1980. Their 
shareholdings gradually increased to 42 percent in 1990 and to 44 percent in 2000. The 
second largest group of shareholders has been domestic corporations. Their shareholdings 
have been quite stable (around 30 percent) over the 20 years. Individuals are the third largest 
groups of shareholders. They have gradually reduced their investment in banks’ shares. In 
1980, they held about 31 percent of the shares. By 2000, their shareholdings declined to be 
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Interestingly, the structure of shareholdings of banks is different from that of 
manufacturing firms shown in Figure 1.2. In this figure, we include all listed manufacturing 
firms (1729 firms). In contrast to banks, the fraction of shares of manufacturing firms held 
by financial institutions have been declining substantially from about 35 percent in 1991 to 
about 24 percent in 2000. Individuals, in contrast, have increased their shareholdings 
significantly during the mid of the 1990s from about 30 percent in 1995 to about 39 percent 
in 2000.   
  Next, we investigate who are the top shareholders and the fraction of shares they 
own. Panel A of Table 2 presents the mean percentage of banks’ shares held by the top one, 
three, five, and ten largest shareholders. In Panel B, we provide the same statistics for the 
manufacturing firms for comparison. In general, our results reveal that the degree of 
ownership concentration in the banking industry is relatively stable. For example, the 
average shareholdings by the largest shareholder are about 5.3 percent in 1980, 5 percent in 
1990 and 7.7 percent in 2000. The average shareholdings by the three largest shareholders 
are about 13.1 percent, 12.7 percent, and 14.7 percent in 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively. 
The average shares held by the top five largest shareholders are around 18 to 20 percent over 
1980-2000.  
The ownership concentration is by far higher for manufacturing firms. The average 
shareholdings by the largest shareholder ranges from 18.8 percent in 1991 to 21.4 percent in 
2000. The mean shareholdings by the top three and top five largest shareholders are about 
twice the degree of concentration for banks (see also Prowse 1992). We will discuss some 
explanations to this phenomenon after identifying who are the largest shareholders. 
Table 3 highlights interesting stylized facts on the identity of the top three 
shareholders. The choice of the cut-off at the top three is due to the monitoring incentive 
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shares to have sufficient incentives to exert corporate governance (see Table 2). The equity 
holdings by the forth and fifth largest shareholder, however, are too small. They own less 
than three percent of outstanding shares. Conversely, the top three shareholders can also be 
detrimental to the bank value if they enable bank managers to become entrenched.   
We find that insurers, in particular, life insurers and banks, dominate the top three 
shareholders. Statistically, the proportion of banks with insurers and banks appearing among 
the top three shareholders is 41.9 percent, 55.1 percent, and 53.3 percent in 1980, 1990 and 
2000, respectively. In all periods, the percentage of these shareholders is greater in larger 
nationwide banks (city banks, long term credit banks and trust banks) than in smaller 
regional banks (banks and second tier regional banks). Specifically, in all periods more than 
a half of the nationwide city banks (54.5 percent, 63.6 percent, and 64.3 percent in 1980, 
1990 and 2000, respectively) have insurers and banks as the top three shareholders. As for 
regional banks and second tier regional banks, insurers and banks are among the top three 
shareholders in 38 percent, 53.1 percent and 51.6 percent of the banks in 1980, 1990 and 
2000, respectively. 
Other groups of investors that appear among the top three shareholders are finance 
and security companies, corporations, the bank’s investment fund held by its employees, 
foreign institutional investors, and individuals. The fraction of banks in our sample that do 
not have a single bank and insurer among the top three shareholders is very small. 
Specifically, there are only about 3.2 percent, 3.4 percent and 0.9 percent of them in 1980, 
1990 and 2000, respectively.   
Our investigation also shows that city banks and other types of banks are owned by 
different groups of investors. More precisely, until the wave of the mega mergers in 2000, 
the principal top three shareholders of city banks had been almost only life insurance 
 11companies. The only two exceptions are the Tokai Bank (in which the Toyota Motor 
Corporation has been its largest shareholder), and the Daiwa Bank (in which the Osaka Gas 
Enterprise had been its largest shareholder until the end of the 1980s, and later on Nomura 
Securities took the place).   
We also find that the ownership structure is very stable in such a way that with two 
exceptions all the nationwide city banks have the same investor as their largest shareholder. 
The two exceptions are the Daiwa Bank and the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank. In the Daiwa 
Bank, the largest shareholder changed once around the end of the 1980s. In the case of the 
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, the ownership structure changed significantly mainly due to 
financial distress around the mid of the 1990s before the bank went bankrupt.   
Another interesting finding is that in many city banks the same insurers have taken 
positions as the largest, second largest, and third largest shareholders over the 20 years under 
our investigation. Out of the total 13 city banks, the bank that had the most stable ownership 
structure is the Sanwa Bank. Amazingly, the ranking of its top three largest shareholders 
remained the same over 1980-1998 before it merged with the Tokai Bank and the Toyo Trust 
and Banking Corporation to become the UFJ Bank in April 2001. In three banks, the ranking 
of the top three shareholders was not changed at all until the mergers occurred. Among them 
is the Bank of Tokyo. In five banks, the ranking of the top three had remained stable until the 
mid of the 1990s when the banking crisis occurred. The financial distress is probably 
responsible for the changes in the ownership structure. 
In regional banks and second tier regional banks, however, insurers are relatively 
less important as the top three shareholders. Insurance companies alone only appear in about 
5-6 percent of the banks. Nationwide banks appear more often among the top three 
shareholders. Statistically, nationwide banks alone were among the top three shareholders in 
15.5 percent, 20.8 percent and 20.4 percent in 1980, 1990 and 2000, respectively. The 
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more dominant, appearing in 16.9 percent, 27.1 percent, and 24.7 percent in 1980, 1990 and 
2000, respectively.   
It is important to note that the relatively low concentrated shareholdings in banks 
are probably due to the regulatory environment. Until 1987, the anti-monopoly regulations 
restricted shareholdings by a single bank as well as insurers to no more than 10 percent of a 
single firm. For banks, the limit has since been lower to 5 percent.   
In summary, insurance companies and banks dominate the top three shareholder 
positions of banks. The ownership structure is unique in that the shareholdings are quite 
stable The ranking of the largest shareholders and their shareholdings have remained more or 
less the same for at least two decades. 
 
3.3 Large Shareholder: Active or Silent? 
The stable ownership structure implies that banks might have established close 
relationships with their largest shareholders. As information asymmetries are likely to be 
mitigated by having such close ties, the largest shareholders could be effective monitors. 
However, we are skeptical about such arguments. In our view, both insurers and banks are 
not trustworthy as monitors for they have weak corporate governance hence have plenty of 
slack to pursue non value-maximizing policies. Komiya (1994) goes so far as to suggest that 
the management maximizes the wealth of the current employees. In addition, insures appear 
to lack of monitoring incentives and perhaps lack of monitoring expertise as well.   
 Similar to the banking industry, the insurance industry had been regulated (see 
Hoshi and Kashyap 2001). For example, insurance premiums were determined by the MOF 
and were made standard among all companies until the Big Bang deregulation in 1996. The 
ranking of the top insurers had remained unchanged over a long period of time, which is 
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two have been the Nippon Life Insurance Company and the Dai-ichi Life Insurance 
Company. In effect, the market pressure did not exist to force insurers to be efficient. More 
importantly, like banks, no insurance companies were allowed to go bankrupt. Hence, like 
the banking industry, the moral hazard problems were created by regulations, and were not 
efficiently constrained by the financial authority.   
In addition, weak corporate governance is contributable to the equity and debt 
structures. Regarding the equity structure, almost all of the insurers, and in particular life 
insurers that dominate the market, are mutual companies. Statistically, as of March 2000, 14 
out of 46 life insurance companies are mutual companies. These fourteen companies, 
however, are so large that they share about 94 percent of the total assets (Shikano 2001). The 
residual owners of these mutual insurance companies are the policyholders. As the 
policyholders are to a large extent dispersed individuals, they are less likely to have strong 
monitoring incentives. Regarding the debt structure, as insurers are only allowed to issue 
subordinate bonds, they face less pressure from creditors.   
There is an important transaction that probably limits the incentive to be tough 
monitors. It appears that banks probably allow insurers who are their large shareholders to 
send sales representatives inside their offices to sell insurance policies to the banks’ 
employees. The opposite case is apparent as well. For example in 1988 when the Asahi life 
Insurance Company sold out its shareholdings of the Industrial Bank of Japan, the contracts 
held by the banks’ employees vanished (see Komiya 1994). Given that the size of banks is 
relatively large, this transaction should be substantial. However, as insurers are not listed 
companies, there is no statistic evidence showing how valuable this transaction is. We think 
that these transactions may be more worthwhile to insurers than the capital gains and 
dividends received as shareholders. These benefits could be so large that they might cancel 
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In addition, insurance companies turned out to rely on banks for funding since they 
have been in financial troubles starting around the latter half of the 1990s. Fukao (2001) 
shows that as of March 2000, banks provided about ¥2.3 trillion of subordinated credit and 
surplus notes to life-insurance companies. Life-insurance companies in turn provided ¥6.7 
trillion of subordinated credit to banks while also holding another ¥7.7 trillion of banks 
stocks.  
The following incidence is consistent with our argument that insurers were not 
tough on the management. Around the end of the 1980s immediately after the BIS capital 
adequacy regulation came into effect, many banks could not meet the standard and needed to 
increase their capitals. Instead of being tough on poorly performing banks, insurers rescued 
them by buying their subordinate debts. These measures were directed by the government, 
however (see Hanazaki and Horiuchi 2003a).   
Similarly, we also argue that nationwide banks might not be active monitors who 
discipline the (regional or smaller) banks in which they own large equity positions. It also 
appears that implicit agreements exist in the banking industry that they would not interfere 
with each other management. Our argument is also consistent with the findings of Morck et 
al. (2000) that the equity ownership by banks is negatively related to performance of 
non-financial firms they own.   
Following the literature, we argue that weak corporate governance affects 
managerial risk taking behavior positively (Saunders et al. 1990; Gorton and Rosen 1995; 
Knopf and Teall 1996; Anderson and Campbell 2000). Accordingly, we hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Management of banks in which insurers and banks appear among the three 
largest shareholders is entrenched, and hence the banks perform poorer than other banks. 
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Further, we argue that lending strategies employed by the entrenched managers are 
dependent on economic conditions. During good times when banks have abundant resources, 
entrenched managers are likely to extend loans aggressively as well as make investments 
that are beneficial to managers themselves (Shleifer and Vishny 1989; Jensen 1993; Dinc 
2003). In the Japanese bank context, the incentives of increasing loans are partly attributable 
to the promotion system. For loan officers, until recently, the performance evaluation was 
based on the ability to extend lending, not on the loan performance. The amount of lending 
was crucial in particular to senior officers who aim to be promoted to the top executive level, 
which is the highest achievement in their career. To achieve this, senior officers have to gain 
support not only from the incumbent top executives but also from their junior colleagues. 
Favors to junior colleagues could be done by establishing new branches so that their junior 
colleagues could also have the chances of getting promotion to become branch heads. To 
create a demand for new branches, they had to extend more loans. 
However, when investment opportunities deteriorated during bad times, entrenched 
managers are likely to make poor decisions regarding investment and restructuring (Gorton 
and Rosen 1995; Boot 1992)). In fact, incumbent managers during the 1990s appear to play 
the wait-and-see game hoping that bad loans would be recovered when the economy picked 
up. The intention was probably to avoid taking the responsibilities since the disposition of 
bad loans was likely to reduce the capital bases substantially to below the BIS standard. In 
contrast to other OECD countries, Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2003b) find that Japanese banks 
did not significantly reduce employment, staff costs, and branches during the first half of the 
1990s even though they had performed poorly. We argue that incumbent managers were able 
to delay taking drastic restructuring policies because there was not much pressure from large 
shareholders. Accordingly, our next testable hypotheses are as follow. 
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Hypothesis 2.1: During good times, entrenched banks extend loans aggressively. 
Hypothesis 2.2: During bad times, entrenched banks delay taking restructuring measures. 
We split the sample period into two distinct periods: 1980-1991 and 1992-2000, 
inclusive. The period 1980-1991 is characterized as a good period from the fact that the 
Japanese economy was booming. It is also considered as the period with substantial 
regulatory restrictions. The period from 1992 to 2000 is classified as bad times after the 
collapse of the bubble economy. It is also considered as the one with decreased regulatory 
constraints. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
In this section, we test the hypotheses discussed in Section 3. First we examine 
whether the top three largest shareholders allows managers of the banks they own to become 
entrenched. Then, we check whether entrenched managers take different strategies regarding 
lending.  
 
4.1 Performance of Entrenched Banks   
Following the literature, we use four alternative measures of performance: the ratio 
of ordinary income (income before tax and before extraordinary gains and losses) to total 
assets (ROA), the pretax returns on equity (ROE), the BIS ratio of net worth to total assets 
(capital-adequacy ratio), and the ratio of NPLs to total loans outstanding (NPL ratio). The 
capital-adequacy ratio and the NPL ratio also indicate the level of risk taking. Higher 
capital-adequacy ratio implies lower risk taking and hence better performance. In contrast, a 
higher NPL ratio implies higher risk taking and poorer performance. 
Some remarks on the data on the NPLs should be made. The NPL used here is based 
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statements. The data is available from FY 1992 onwards. The definitions, however, are 
different from period to period. From FY 1992 to FY 1994, the NPLs only include the loans 
to borrowers in legal bankruptcy and past due loans in arrears by 6 months or more. From 
FY 1995 to 1996, the NPLs were extended to include loans whose interest rate had been 
lowered below the original contract level. From FY 1997 to FY 2000, past due loans in 
arrears by 3 months or more and restructured loans were also included (see the website of the 
Financial Services Agency at http://www.fsa.go.jp/) .                                               
Table 4 shows the results of the univariate analysis on the effects of the three largest 
shareholders on performance. The results support our hypothesis that banks that have 
insurers and banks as their top three shareholders have poorer performance than other banks. 
This finding implies that insurers and banks as large shareholders do not monitor, but instead 
collude with the bank management and enable them to be entrenched. Specifically, the 
entrenched banks have the mean ROAs of 0.47 percent and -0.05 percent during the period 
of 1980-1991 and 1992-2000, respectively. These ROAs are significantly lower than those of 
non-entrenched banks of 0.51 percent and 0.07 percent during the period of 1980-1991 and 
1992-2000, respectively.   
We also find similar results when we use the ROE. During the period of 1980-1991, 
the mean ROE of entrenched banks is 16.54 percent. It is not significantly different from that 
of the non-entrenched banks which is 16.69 percent, however. Interestingly, during 
1992-2000 the entrenched banks were in the red based on the ROE (-3.39 percent). The 
non-entrenched banks, on the other hand, had a positive ROE of 2.33 percent and the 
difference in the ROE is statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
 Furthermore, we find that the entrenched banks appear to take higher risk than 
non-entrenched banks using the two measures of risk and hence performance. The 
 18entrenched banks have lower capital-adequacy ratio than the non-entrenched banks, as well 
as have higher NPL ratio for both periods. The difference, however, is significant only in the 
case of the combination of the capital-adequacy ratio and the period of 1980-1991. In any 
case, the results imply that entrenched banks took excessive risk, in particular during the 
good times. 
 
4.2 Entrenched Banks and Lending Behavior 
In this Section, we draw the regression models to be used to analyze lending 
patterns of the entrenched banks against non-entrenched banks. Specifically, we test whether 
entrenched banks lend aggressively during good times, and still continue extend lending 
even during bad times when lending opportunities are rare and hence were supposed to 
cutoff loans. To assess this issue, we estimate the percentage change in total loan outstanding 
(Loans) on a dummy variable representing entrenched banks (Entrenched Banks) and other 
control variables.   
A number of control variables are included in the model to control for the 
characteristics of banks as well as the state of the economy. First, we control for the 
characteristics of their client firms, in particular real estate firms. The lending to the real 
estate industry is regarded as one of the major industries which received huge loans during 
the bubble periods. A substantial part of these loans turned out to be non-performing in the 
1990s. To capture this effect, we include the percentage change in the ratio of lending to the 
real estate industry to total loan outstanding (Real Estate Loans). Second, we also control for 
profitability using the ratio of ordinary income (income before tax and before extraordinary 
gains and losses) to total assets (ROA). As profitability increases a bank’s cash flow, it 
improves the lending capacity.   
Third, we include three dummy variables to control for the effects of types of banks. 
 19These dummies are nationwide city banks, long-term credit banks, and trust banks. The 
benchmark banks hence are regional banks and second tier regional banks that operate 
locally. In other words, these three dummies capture the size and business line effects (see 
Hoshi and Patrick 1999). 
Forth, we control for the business cycle effects by including real annual GDP 
growth rate at the 1995 price (GDP). Finally, to control for the land price bubble effects we 
include the percentage changes in land price indices for city areas (Land Prices). Also, note 
that the lending practices of banks in Japan appear to be not project evaluation based, but to 
a large extent based on the assessment of land collateral. This variable captures the land 
collateral effect as well.   
Specifically, the loan equation can be elaborated as follow. 
(1)  Loansit = f(Entrenched Banksit , Profitabilityit , City Banksi,,   
Long Tterm Credit Banksi , Trust Banki ,   
Real Estate Loansit , GDPt, Land Pricest Trust Banksi), 
 
where the subscripts i and t indicate bank i and time t, respectively. 
To address the potential endogeneity effect that profitability and lending may be 
simultaneously determined, we estimate a simultaneous equation system of loans and 
performance. The profitability equation is specified as follows.   
(2)  Profitabilityit = f(Loansit, Entrenched Banksit, Branchesit , Employeesit, Staff Costsit,  
City Banksi,, Long Tterm Credit Banksi , Trust Banki ,   
Real Estate Loansit , GDPt, Land Pricest, 
Branchesit × Entrenched Banksit,  
Employeesit × Entrenched Banksit, Staff Costsit × Entrenched Banksit),  
where  Branches and Employees  are the percentage change in the number of 
 20branches, and the number of employees, respectively. Staff Costs are the percentage change 
in the sum of wages and salaries over total operation expenses. 
  The summary statistics of all the variables in the two equations are shown in Table 4. 
We run the simultaneous equations of the two models using the two-stage least square 
(2SLS) estimation method with random effects. In the first stage, the profitability model 
(equation (2)) is regressed to obtain the fitted values. In the second stage, we use the fitted 
value of profitability as the instrumental variable of the profitability, and then run a 
regression of equation (1).   
  The regression results of the 2SLS estimation are presented in Table 6. Panel A and 
B present the results for the period of 1981-1991 (good times) and 1992-2000 (bad times), 
respectively. The estimated coefficients on the dummy Entrenched Banks have positive sign 
as expected in both periods (Specification (1)). The coefficients are strongly significantly at 
the 5 percent level. The results are consistent with our hypothesis that compared to non 
entrenched banks, entrenched banks extended more loans during good times. The loans were 
not terminated, but still continued growing even after the bubble collapsed. This effect has a 
larger magnitude for the period of 1981-1991. Ironically, the regression results indicate that 
compared to non entrenched banks, entrenched banks extended on average 6.98 percent 
more loans during the 1981-1991 period. During the period of 1992-2000, the loans made by 
the entrenched banks were on average 2.51 percent more than non entrenched banks.   
The estimated coefficients on Real Estate Loans turn out to be statistically 
insignificant for the period of 1981-1991. During the period of 1992-2000, however, the 
estimated coefficient on Real Estate loans is negative and significant. The insignificant 
estimated results are inconsistent with the conventional view that Japanese banks 
aggressively extended more loans to the real estate industry in particular in the 1980s. Rather, 
the results indicate that in general banks cut the lending to real estate firms after the bubble 
 21collapsed. In addition, we investigate further whether or not the entrenched banks extended 
more loans to the real estate industry. To examine this prediction, we include the interaction 
term between the dummy Entrenched Banks and Real Estate loans in the both the loan and 
profitability models. The estimated results are shown in Specification (2). No significant 
results are observed, however.   
The estimated coefficients on the proxy for profitability are positive as expected and 
strongly significant in all the models. This evidence suggests that profitable banks appear to 
have the slacks to lend more in all the periods.   
Regarding the types of banks, while the estimated coefficients on the dummy 
variable City Banks are strongly significant at the 1 percent level, the estimated coefficients 
on Long Term Credit Banks are weakly significant at the 10 percent level. The results imply 
that compared to regional banks, city banks and long term credit banks appear to extend 
more loans during the good times. Ironically, loans made by city banks and long term credit 
banks grew about 16 percent and 21 percent more than regional banks, respectively. The 
estimated results of the two bank dummies, however, turn out to be statistically insignificant 
for the period of 1992-2000. In contrast, the lending behaviors of trust banks appear to be 
different. For the period of 1981-1991, the estimated coefficients on Trust Banks are positive 
and significant at the 10 percent level. This empirical evidence implies that trust banks 
extended less loans compared to regional banks. However, during the bad times the 
estimated coefficients on Trust Banks are positive and strongly significant at the 1 percent 
level. The estimated results suggest that trust banks lent approximately 15 percent more than 
regional banks. 
Finally, we find that the growth rate of the economy (GDP) affects loans negatively 
during good and bad times. We do not have good explanation for this finding, however. 
 
 224.3 Discussion: Keiretsu Relationships and Japanese Banks 
We are aware that the ties among keiretsu firms are important in Japan. However, 
we believe that the keiretsu issues are not relevant as far as banks are concerned as there is 
no cross ownership tie between their largest shareholders and the banks. In other words, the 
cross-shareholdings that are prevalent in many keiretsu  firms do not exist in the top 
shareholder level. As show in Section 3, similar to other banks, the top three shareholders of 
the so-called keiretsu banks, which are among the city banks, apparently had also been 
insurers. Among these insurers, one of them has always been the insurer who is affiliated to a 
keiretsu in which the bank belongs to. Note that this keiretsu membership is defined 
according to their membership of the six keiretsu presidential clubs. However, since the 
major insurers are mutual companies, they are not tied to any of the keiretsu firms in the 
same group via ownership. So, compared to business groups in emerging economies, the ties 
between keiretsu firms are much looser (Khanna and Yafeh 2002). Family does not appear as 
ultimate controlling shareholder. In addition, there is no centralized decision making 
mechanism. Accordingly, we also doubt that the interests of the insurers are aligned with 
those of the banks they own shares simply because they are affiliated to the same group and 
join the same presidential club. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our analysis supports the argument of Hanazaki and Horiuchi (2002 and 2003) that 
in the banking industry, large shareholders do not play a role in monitoring managers. The 
large shareholders who apparently are banks and insurance companies turn out to collude or 
conspire with management. Consequently, the management might become entrenched as 
they are shielded from being monitored by outsiders. Our empirical results indeed show that 
during the 1980s these “entrenched banks” extended more lending, and after the collapse of 
 23the bubble they did not dramatically cut off the loans to cope with the accumulated 
non-performing loans.   
An extension may be done by examining other restructurings including downsizing, 
employee layoffs, and salary cuts. In addition, it may be worthwhile to investigate whether 
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8Table 2: Ownership Concentration 
This table presents the percentage of shares held by the ten largest shareholders. The data is 
as of the end of a fiscal year (March). Data sources are the yukashoken hokokusho (Company 
Annual Reports), various issues. 
(Unit: %)
Fiscal Year Top 1 Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 No. of banks
1980 5.3 13.1 18.7 28.5 93
1985 5.1 12.9 18.7 28.9 101
1990 5.0 12.7 18.5 28.8 118
1995 5.4 13.1 19.1 29.7 117
2000 7.7 14.7 20.1 29.5 107
(Unit: %)
Fiscal Year Top 1 Top 3 Top 5 Top 10 No. of companies
1991 18.8 30.2 37.5 49.0 1,227
1995 19.9 31.3 38.3 49.2 1,309
2000 21.4 33.8 40.8 51.2 1,729
Panel A: Banking Industry





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4:  Univariate Analysis: Ownership Structure and Performance 
 
This table shows the univariate tests of mean performance of the two groups of banks 
classified according to the ownership structure. Entrenched banks are banks in which all the 
top three largest shareholders are insurance companies and banks. Otherwise, they are non 
entrenched banks. ROA is the ratio of ordinary income (income before tax and before 
extraordinary gains and losses) to total assets. ROE is the pretax returns on equity. 
Capital-adequacy ratio is the BIS ratio of net worth to total assets. The NPL ratio is the ratio 
of NPLs to total loans. Mean differences are tested using the t-test. ***, **, and * denote 
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2Table 6:  Regression Results 
This table presents 2SLS estimates where loans and performance are endogenously determined. 
Entrenched Banks is a dummy variable indicating banks in which all the top three shareholders 
are only insurers and banks. ROA is the ratio of ordinary income (income before tax and before 
extraordinary gains and losses) to total assets. Real Estate Loans is the percentage changes in 
the ratio of lending to the real estate industry to total loan outstanding. GDP is real annual GDP 
growth rate at the 1995 price. Land Prices is the percentage change in land price indices for 
city areas. City Banks,  Long Term Credit Banks, and Trust Banks are dummy variables 
indicating city banks, long term credit banks, and trust banks, respectively. Figures in the 
parentheses are standard deviations.  ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 




Entrenched Banks 6.977** 6.130*
(3.500) (3.391)
Real Estate Loans 0.069 -0.039
(0.101) (0.149)
Real Estate Loans × Entrenched Banks 0.202
(0.201)
City Banks 16.064*** 15.918***
(5.969) (6.047)
Long Term Credit Banks 21.285* 21.647*
(11.347) (11.675)
Trust Banks -29.569** -30.220**
(14.667) (15.286)








Adjusted R-squared 0.021 0.021
No. of observations 1122 1122
No. of banks 119 119
Panel A: During good times (1981-1991)
 
 
 33Panel B: During bad times (1992-2000)
(1) (2)
Entrenched Banks 2.511** 2.862**
(1.081) (1.159)
Real Estate Loans -0.196*** -0.125
(0.070) (0.093)
Real Estate Loans × Entrenched Banks -0.139
(0.134)
City Banks 2.637 2.509
(1.942) (1.916)
Long Term Credit Banks 0.336 0.408
(3.521) (3.490)
Trust Banks 14.990*** 14.811***
(3.189) (3.173)








Adjusted R-squared 0.043 0.043
No. of observations 925 925





































        Figure 1.1 The Banking Industry




 Sources: Ministry of Finance, the yukashoken hokokusho (Company Annual Reports) 
various issues. 
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